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Understanding how subjective experience can arise from the nuts and bolts of matter is known as
the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996). Nobody has come close to solving this. One
approach, type-Amaterialism (Chalmers, 2002) (hereafter, hard-core physicalism), simply dismisses
the hard problem altogether. On this view, nothing about subjectivity or qualia needs explanation
beyond their functional underpinnings: consciousness is an illusion, and the states of our inner
world, merely dispositions to act (Churchland, 1985; Dennett, 1988). Should we hope that by
studying the “illusion” of consciousness (Dennett, 2003) we might unpick the real mechanism, in
the way, for example, psychologists understandmotion perception by studying the waterfall illusion
(Mather et al., 2008)? According to hard-core physicalists—no, it’s illusions all the way down; it has
to be, because there is no true mechanism of consciousness to be revealed, it is simply the name we
give to the inner state of the complex machine we are: the lights are not really on, it only seems that
way.
Perhaps hard-core proponents are safer with the less controversial statement that consciousness
is not what it seems. Numerous examples from experimental psychology support this: contrary
to daily experience, our sensations and/or perceptions of the world are inhomogeneous (Baldwin
et al., 2012), internally constructed (Ramachandran and Gregory, 1991), lossy (Pashler, 1988), and
not even needed for some behaviors (Weiskrantz, 1985). However, I do not take these observations
to empower the central hard-core claim that while direct experience is undeniably felt it must be
discredited if we are to understand what needs to be understood about consciousness (Dennett,
2001). Indeed, this position leaves some people feeling as empty as the explanation itself (e.g.,
see Nagel, 2017). Might there be another answer, one that preserves the third-person tradition of
objective science, while acknowledging the importance of there being something it is like (Nagel,
1974; Jackson, 1982) to be conscious?
Type-B materialism (Chalmers, 2002) (hereafter, soft-core physicalism) is a widespread
alternative. This position is common in neuroscience, where the hunt is on for the neural correlates
of consciousness: the neural states that identify with conscious experiences. However, because
identity is not explanatory, soft-core physicalism ends up looking more like property dualism than
materialism (Chalmers, 1997).
IS THERE ANOTHER WAY?
Oakley and Halligan (2017) (hereafter O&H) believe so. They understand that consciousness
is not a control mechanism for our behavior, but a passive observer of our life narrative, a
narrative that emerges from competition between the challenges and demands of the unconscious.
(O&H prefer the term non-conscious; I draw no distinction.) We have no free will (e.g., Harris,
2012; Miles, 2015), this much is clear under materialism, compatibilist claims to the contrary
(Dennett, 1984) being wordplay that shifts the meaning of the term free will: I am not being
coerced into writing this article, I do it of my own free will; not just a figure of speech but, for
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example, the basis of a framework for our justice system, one
we need, but one that reinforces the delusion1. For some,
this delusion is a good thing (e.g., Smilansky, 2002), the
concern being that the public might not accommodate the
knowledge of delusional agency for the better (see The truly
nefarious neurosurgeon in Dennett, 2013). However, recent
experimental work suggests the opposite conclusion: that such
beliefs can induce prosocial behavior (Casper et al., 2017).
Another perspective steps outside the philosophical debate
(Lavazza, 2016). Whilst acknowledging the attendant legal and
moral problems, Lavazza suggests tests of cognitive control from
which an index of an agent’s operational capacity for a pragmatic
form of free will could be derived.
In sum, the compatibilist view is that sentient biological units
have the elbow room (Dennett, 1984) to operate free of coercion,
but the purist (Harris, 2012) always finds a causal chain of events
leading to the current disposition—there is no freedom to be
found (Harris and Dennett, 2016).
O&H build on this disconnection between conscious
experience (of will) and execution of action, suggesting
consciousness is merely a side-effect of something else going
on; an epiphenomenon, like the colors of the rainbow. They
suggest it is the internal broadcasting—a delightful concept—of
a selective personal narrative that defines the wick of our life
during its transfer to memory. That we are merely subjects
of unconscious authoring is certainly plausible (Nisbett and
Wilson, 1977; Libet, 1985; see Bayne, 2011 for criticism) and, for
some, an intuitive account of our reality and our self (Harris,
2012; Miles, 2015).
There are two main problems with O&H’s thesis on
consciousness. The first is common to all accounts that appeal
to epiphenomenalism: the simple fact is, we can talk about
consciousness. This is not trivial; it means the thing we call
consciousness can influence the underlying system (by causing it
to speak), and in philosophy of mind, epiphenomena do not have
causal feedback (e.g., Megill, 2013), so consciousness cannot be
epiphenomenal (Blackmore, 2004; Bailey, 2006; Robinson, 2015).
For a defense of epiphenomenalism to work, it would have to
be that when I talk of consciousness, I’m using that word to
refer to something else: the mechanistic underpinnings. But this
is not how it feels, when I talk to you about consciousness, I
believe we are both referring to the same felt sense that the
lights are on. Borrowing from Bailey (2006), if the proposed
epiphenomenal status of consciousness seems counter-intuitive
(O&H), the original intuition that is being countered cannot have
been derived from knowledge of consciousness. If it was not clear
before, perhaps we begin to see why the elimination of qualia
and a first-person perspective through hard-core physicalism is
so attractive, if wildly counter-intuitive (Churchland, 1985).
The second problem is that O&H’s theory does not even
require consciousness—we can envisage a machine that is
programmed to store only some of its internal operations in
memory, and call that a personal narrative, but it does not follow
1It is worth emphasizing the distinction between illusion and delusion. The first is
representational and pertains to the senses, the second is conceptual and pertains
to higher-level beliefs. The dividing line is probably murky.
that this will imbue the machine with consciousness. Others have
made similar slips. Humphrey (1986) developed a strong case
that we are social creatures and need to understand ourselves to
understand others; the feedback loop in this self-reflection is the
origin of consciousness. It’s a nice idea, and such a loop may have
value, but a simulation of servo control would include a feedback
loop without needing to be conscious; making the system social
does not change that.
The reason O&H (and others) end up with something
plausible but not persuasive is that their starting point is wrong.
There is a tendency for workers on consciousness to look toward
information processing, or brain neurophysiology, or human
needs and behavior, to roll out something that—ba-ba-boom—
gives us consciousness (this is typical of soft-core physicalism).
Not only does the explanatory gap remain (Levine, 1983) but
the case that demands the emergence of consciousness qua
consciousness is not made either. So is there a better starting
point?
I think there is. Instead of arguing about whether there
is a hard question of consciousness (i.e., whether there is a
phenomenon that needs explaining; Chalmers, 1997), for which
no solution is in sight, it might be better to ask, what do we have
that requires consciousness (e.g., Humphrey, 2006)?
To illustrate the why (and not worry about the how), I
consider two possible answers to the question above2. The first
is qualia, the individual instances (over space and time) of our
subjective conscious experiences. By definition, qualia require
consciousness. Putting aside the possibility they are not what
they seem (Dennett, 1988), might we need them (in some sense),
and hence became conscious? How are qualia used? When we
see “red,” for example, we are (typically) experiencing our belief
(derived from post-receptoral computations in the brain) about
the spectral reflectance properties of a surface we are observing
(even if we lack the technical knowhow to express it that way3).
When we say “I see ‘red”’ we are using the symbols of language
to broadcast that belief externally. Like the word “red,” the quale
“red” is not a property of the outside world, but also a symbol (or
tag), this time in the domain of consciousness. It is an internal
broadcast of our belief (typically with greater precision than
word symbols) about the external world. (Other qualia do this
for other sensory modalities, and for internally generated signals
too). Qualia are valuable. However, appealing to the symbolic
nature of qualia as a justification for being conscious puts us on
shaky ground: symbols are valuable for information processing
whether the system is presumed conscious or not (Marr, 1982).
The second answer is perhaps more promising: we have the
delusion of free will4. This operates on our internal models of:
the world stage, the players, our self and our feelings—our qualia.
Consciousness is a necessary vehicle for this delusion, and, by
association, a colorful source of internal virtual lighting. For me
to experience myself, as though in the driving seat, as though I
2A third possibility is offered by Cashmore (2010), who points out that our sense
of agency also brings the burden of responsibility; a pro-social factor.
3Which demonstrates the power of direct experience over language.
4We can imagine being conscious without the delusion of free will, but we cannot
imagine having the delusion of free will without being conscious.
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have transcended my neurons (even if I hold a scientific belief
I do not), I must be conscious5. Our question thus becomes:
what is the evolutionary benefit in having the delusion of
free will?
I think we find hints of whatmight be the answer in both O&H
and Humphrey. My operating system/reporting mechanism
is good, but imperfect; to tolerate this deficiency in myself
and others, I can attribute my perceptions of shortcomings,
idiosyncrasies, and inconsistencies to personal choice. This
is executed by sharing a personal narrative through external
broadcast (O&H), and constructing a model of the other
(Humphrey, 1986) with deviations from myself as a starting
point. This sanctions the likes and dislikes held by others
with which I might not agree but which (in my tribe at
least) I can tolerate since, believing they derive from personal
authorship—something I (laughably) value in myself—, I am
excused any destructive inclination I might have for conflicting
(and potentially deficient) biological hardware that is sharing my
space. I trust the other can do likewise by a similar process. A
social alliance, then; one that circumvents a needless invocation
of survival of the fittest. In a nutshell: the delusion of free will
demands consciousness and engenders excuse (of others, but self
too); it smooths over the cracks, most of the time. This is the basis
of social living, fromwhich our species hasmost surely benefitted.
5This might serve as a working definition of consciousness: if a system has the
Gestalt expression that it is something more than the sum of its parts, it is
conscious.
This is not to say that cooperation and altruism need the free will
delusion to emerge (e.g., Santos et al., 2008) but it seems likely it
would help.
I applaud O&H for highlighting that our powers of control
are not driven by consciousness, but they have not solved
(or even tackled) the hard problem, and neither have I.
Rainbows are not illusions, and even if they were, we would
still need to understand their realization by the brain. But
I have suggested a reason why the rainbow of our mind
exists: we need consciousness to express the delusion of
free will.
It is ironic then, that by unpicking the delusional nature of free
will (Harris, 2012), a delusion from which we benefit, we become
better placed to understand the wrong-doing of others, enriching
our society with compassion, given we know they are conscious
too.
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